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EXPERIENCE Is THE LIFE OF THE LAW
Charles E. Ross*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1970, I and other students in the Eupora School System located in
Webster County, Mississippi, were preparing to begin another school year. We
were entering the ninth grade. Our entry into school that year, however, would
be vastly different from those of the preceding classes in the Eupora School
District for one reason. For the first time, blacks and whites would be going to
school together in an integrated system as opposed to attending separate schools
completely segregated by race. The same historic occurrence was also happen-
ing throughout the state of Mississippi.
One would have to be a complete stranger to the history of the South and of
Mississippi to fail to recognize and acknowledge the significance of integration
of schools as a major, historic shift in the life of the state and of the South in gen-
eral. Though school segregation was also widespread in the northern states, it
was in the South that it was identified with "our way of life." In Mississippi,
whites and blacks were legally mandated to live in separate worlds with regard to
schools, drinking fountains, and practically all other aspects of life. Though
some of the barriers had begun to fall in some areas such as transportation and
voting rights due to the direct action of civil rights protestors and intervention
through the federal courts and through federal legislation, segregation of the
races remained the dominant mind set of white Mississippi. With the massive
integration of the Mississippi schools in 1970, the children of the state were put
on the leading edge of the battle to change the mores of our society.
Practically every Mississippian coming of age at that time was affected by the
decision to integrate public education. Those students and families, both black
and white, that remained in the public schools were forced for the first time to
deal on a regular basis with people of the opposite race in the school context. I,
as a white person, personally can still remember my awkwardness, curiosity, and
suspicion on the first day of class. Contrary to the stereotype of southern white
and black children growing up and playing together, I had never, that I can
remember, played with a black child or had a black child as a friend. Quite liter-
ally, it was a new world for me. I suspect the same was true for many other
classmates, both black and white.
Those who did not remain in the Mississippi public school system, by far pre-
dominately whites, abandoned the public school system and set up new private
* Charles E. Ross is a shareholder/partner with the Jackson, Mississippi firm of Wise Carter Child &
Caraway. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy as a distinguished graduate in 1978, and
from Harvard Law School with honors in 1988.
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institutions.' The lives of these Mississippians were also radically altered as a
result of the choices they made or that they felt were forced upon them by inte-
gration.
For practically all Mississippians in school or with children in school at the
time, the change was radical, often tumultuous, sometimes intimidating and
laced with the fear of uncertainty, but nevertheless very real. Those students and
families involved, both white and black, can rightly claim that they were leading
actors, whether willingly or unwillingly, in an extraordinary time in the history of
Mississippi.
The purpose of this Article is to focus on the two converging forces that culmi-
nated in the extraordinary event of school integration in Mississippi and other
places in the South. These two forces were: (1) the history of resistance to
school integration and to the whole concept of civil rights for blacks in the
South, with Mississippi as the prime example; and (2) a line of Supreme Court
decisions implementing the seminal case of Brown v. Board of Education,2
wherein the doctrine of "separate but equal" in public education was declared
unconstitutional.
First, I shall review the major Supreme Court cases leading up to and culminat-
ing in Brown. Then I shall briefly review the resistance to Brown in the South
using the Mississippi experience as an illustrative example. Next, I will examine
how the Supreme Court directed that Brown be implemented in the face of the
resistance with particular ,-, focus on Green v. County Swo- l Board where the
Court struck down freedom of choice systems and held, in essence, that the rem-
edy for state mandated segregation was state mandated integration "now." The
philosophy of Green was adamant in tone and substance that the goal of elimi-
nating segregation "root and branch" required forced integration without much
regard to other societal values. Such was probably necessary at the time consid-
ering the massive resistance to Brown. The reality was that local and state gov-
ernments were not going to implement Brown in good faith if they were given
any discretion whatsoever.
I then shall examine the recent Supreme Court case of Freeman v. Pitts' where
the Court has strongly indicated that the time period of "now" does not mean for-
ever and that federal court remedies in the 1990s must take into account the real-
ities of today, not just the realities of a time past. I suggest that such an approach
is appropriate and is a return to the original purpose of Brown. Just as the early
1. According to a report by Mr. Garvin Johnson, State Superintendent of Education in Mississippi in 1970,
there was approximately an eight percent drop in the enrollment of public schools in the state for the 1970-71
school year as compared to the previous school year. 2 A HISTORY OF MississippI 413 (Richard Aubrey, ed.
1973). In some school districts, however, there was massive white flight to private academies. In Noxubee
County, Mississippi, for example, white enrollment in the public schools fell from 705 to 71 between January
1970 and September 1970, and in grades nine through twelve, there were only twenty-three white students in
1970. See COLIN CRAWFORD, UPROAR AT DANCING RABBIT CREEK: BATTLING OVER RACE, CLASS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 91-93 (1996). In some parts of Mississippi, including Noxubee County, the situation remains
essentially the same in the 1990s. In Noxubee County during the 1992-93 school year, again as an example,
there was one white student at the public high school. CRAWFORD, supra at 91-93.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
4. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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cases implementing Brown, with their dominant focus on forced integration as
the cure to forced segregation, used a necessary and proper remedy considering
the times, current reality counsels a return to a more balanced approach that
respects the motive and intents of local and state governments. Simply put, a lot
can and has changed in forty-two years, and it is totally appropriate and neces-
sary that the change include the law for implementing the Brown definition of
what is constitutionally "right and wrong" in the area of racial school policy.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great American jurist, wrote in his book, The
Common Law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessi-
ties of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public
policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in deter-
mining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story
of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as
if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In
order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to
become.5
This Article is one writer's attempt to show how Holmes' description of the law
has played out and continues to do so in Supreme Court desegregation decisions.
II. CHANGING THE DEFINITION OF RIGHT AND WRONG:
Brown v. Board of Education
Undoubtedly the most important decision in the twentieth century concerning
government authority in race relations in general, and more specifically in public
education, is that of Brown v. Board of Education.6 Brown established that it was
not constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment for states to prohibit children from going to school
together just because the children were of a different race, even if the schools
provided that the schools for each separate group of children were equal in all
tangible factors such as buildings, equipment, funding, and staffing. Put another
way, Brown held that the "separate but equal" doctrine With regard to public edu-
cation was constitutionally impermissible, a holding directly reversing, as
opposed to merely modifying, established Supreme Court precedent. For this
reason, to understand Brown, it is necessary to first go back and examine the
decision that Brown overruled, Plessy v. Ferguson.7
A. Plessy v. Ferguson
Plessy was not a school integration case at all. Instead, Plessy dealt with the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute providing for separate railroad carriages
for white and colored races.8 The petitioner before the Supreme Court, Plessy,
5. OLIVER W HOMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Id.
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was 7/8th Caucasian and 1/8th African blood.' The reason he was before the
Court was because he had violated Louisiana law requiring blacks and whites to
ride in separate rail cars.1" When Plessy had attempted to ride on a passenger
railroad car in Louisiana, and had insisted upon sitting in the coach reserved for
whites, the conductor on the coach assigned him to a seat in the car reserved for
"persons . . . of the colored race."11 When Plessy refused to comply, he was
forcibly ejected and imprisoned for violating the Louisiana statute mandating
"equal but separate accommodations of the white, and colored races."12
Plessy attacked the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute requiring separa-
tion of the races on the grounds that it was inconsistent with both the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 The Court quickly dismissed the Thirteenth
Amendment argument on the basis that this Amendment outlawed slavery or
involuntary servitude, but that "[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinc-
tion between the white and colored races.., has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude." 4
With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Plessy Court also
rejected Plessy's claim by first reasoning that, though the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to enforce the "absolute equality of the two races before the law"
the equality mandated was only "political equality" and did not extend to "social
equality."1" To illustrate the difference, the Court cited prior precedent holding
that a state could not prohibit people of the "colored race" from sitting on a jury
because such a prohibition "implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which
lessened the security of the right of the colored race, and was a step toward
reducing them to a condition of servility."16 The Court rejected this implication
with regard to the use of railroad cars by passengers, however, on the basis that
the exercise of the police power to provide separate but equal railroad cars was
reasonable in that it promoted the public good and was not intended for the
oppression of a particular class. 7 To buttress its "reasonable" argument, the
Court noted that even the Congress of the United States required separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia.
18
The Court further reasoned that the state of Louisiana, through the enforced
separation of the two races, was not stamping the colored race with a "badge of
inferiority," but instead, if members of the colored race felt such a stamp, it was
they themselves as opposed to the state of Louisiana that was imposing the
stamp. 9 The Court flatly rejected the argument that "equal [social] rights cannot
be secured to the negro except by an enforced commingling of the two races."2
9. Id. at 541-42.
10. Id. at 538.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 537. The Louisiana statute in question was cited in Plessy as Acts 1890, No. 111, p. 152.
13. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.
14. Id. at 543.
15. Id. at 543-44.
16. Id. at 545. The prior precedent cited was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
17. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546-47.
18. Id. at 545.
19. Id. at 551.
20. Id.
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Plessy came to stand for the proposition that a state could segregate school chil-
dren according to race as long as the facilities in question being provided by the
state were provided to both races equally.
B. Between Plessy and Brown
Plessy was not a school integration case, but its doctrine that legally mandating
separate but equal facilities, in the provision of services provided by the state for
separate races, was constitutionally permitted, became the legal basis for separate
school systems in the years that followed. The Plessy standard of separate but
equal was explicitly extended to public schooling by the Supreme Court in Gong
Lum v. Rice.2 Between Gong and the Brown decision in 1954, the court battles
over school segregation focused primarily on whether states were complying
with the equality portion of the separate but equal doctrine rather than on
whether the separate but equal doctrine itself was inherently unconstitutional. In
two cases decided four years prior to Brown, for example, the Supreme Court
made it clear that the equality had to be genuine or the separation was unconsti-
tutional.22 The Court in these cases did not, however, address the validity of the
separate but equal doctrine itself. Instead, the focus was on the factual inquiry as
to the element of equality.23
C. Brown v. Board of Education
In Brown v. Board of Education,4 the Court did address directly the constitu-
tional validity of the separate but equal doctrine in a decision which has come to
be regarded as one of the most significant decisions in the twentieth century.
The Brown case arrived at the Court from four separate states: Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.25 The four cases were consolidated under the
name of the Kansas case, not only because it was the first of the four cases the
Justices had decided to hear, but also because using the Kansas case's name
would give the appearance that the Court's action in the case was not directed
only at the South.2"
In each of the separate cases, the black plaintiffs had been denied admission to
schools attended by white children under state laws requiring segregation accord-
ing to race.27 Each lower court had adhered to the validity of the separate but
equal doctrine; the issue in each was whether the black schools were truly
equal.28 In the Kansas, South Carolina and Virginia cases, the lower court had
21. 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927).
22. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
23. Significantly, though, for the first time, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief in both the
McLaurin and Sweatt cases, arguing that Plessy's doctrine of separate but equal was wrong and the Supreme
Court should overrule the same. The Justice Department action was a radical step at the time. See JUAN
WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965 17 (1987).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Id. at 487.
26. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 31.
27. Brown, 347 U.S. at 487.
28. Id.
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denied the plaintiffs' requested relief by either finding that the black and white
schools were substantially equal or by ordering the defendants to equalize the
conditions.29 In the Delaware case, the lower court had ordered the plaintiffs
admitted to the white schools upon a finding of inequality because of the superi-
ority of the white schools to the black schools."0
The Brown Court used these facts to lay the predicate for finding the issue of
the validity of separate but equal "ripe" for decision, or put another way, the
necessity for the court to address the constitutionality of the separate but equal
doctrine itself as opposed to merely applying the doctrine. The Court noted that
there had been six cases since Plessy involving the separate but equal doctrine in
the field of public education where either the validity of the doctrine itself was
not challenged,31 or where inequality was found in the specific benefits afforded
negro students as opposed to white students and relief was granted to the negro
students based upon the inequality. 2 With the facts before the Court in Brown,
however, the Court specifically noted that the negro and white schools involved
in three of the lower court decisions had been found to be either equal or were in
the process of being equalized with respect to "tangible factors" such as build-
ings, curricula and teaching staffs,33 and with the fourth lower court decision (i.e.
the Delaware case), the lower court adhered to the Plessy doctrine, and admitted
the black students to the white school based upon a finding of inequality.34 Even
in the Delaware case, however, the Delaware appeals court had indicated that the
issue. M g, e,+ rviieu if Le equalization program, then in progress, was
accomplished." The Court accepted these factual findings, and in so doing, laid
the necessary predicate for reconsidering the validity of the Plessy separate but
equal holding itself rather than comparing the "tangible factors" in the negro and
white schools involved in each of the cases to determine if they were equal. 6
To address this question, the Court first looked at the history behind the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to see if the answer could be
found by reference to the purpose of the Amendment itself.7 The Court found
the history to be inconclusive because "[w]hat others in Congress and the state
legislatures had in mind [at the time of the Amendment's adoption] cannot be
determined with any degree of certainty,"38 especially since public education was
not a common facet of American life when the Amendment was passed. 9
Because the history of the Amendment was inconclusive, the Court had to look
elsewhere to find a basis for its opinion. The Court chose as its basis the unequal
29. Id. at 487 n.1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 491 (citing Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899), and Gong Lurn v. Rice, 275
U.S. 78 (1927)).
32. Id. (citing McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); and, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)).
33. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
34. Id. at 487 n.1, 492 n.9.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 492.
37. Id. at 489.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 489-90.
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effect of segregation itself, from a developmental standpoint, on black children
when public education was considered in 1954: as "perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments;" as a requirement for "performance of
our most basic public responsibilities;" as the "foundation of good citizenship;"
and as the "principal instrument" in developing cultural values and teaching a
child to "succeed in life."4 The Court thus set the stage for attacking the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine. In other words, considering public education's impor-
tance in twentieth century America, it was undoubtedly a denial of equal oppor-
tunity by the state if state funded separate schools were inherently unequal by
virtue of their separateness. The Court presented the issue as follows: "Does
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the chil-
dren or the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"41
The Court's answer to this question was direct and to the point: "To separate
them [i.e., minority children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."42 As justification for this holding, the Brown Court adopted a finding
of fact from the Kansas lower court:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denot-
ing the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motiva-
tion of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children
and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]
integrated school system."43
The Brown Court then proceeded explicitly to overrule Plessy:
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of
Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [of the Kansas Court that separating the races
denotes inferiority and retards the educational and mental development of negro
children and deprives them of benefits] is amply supported by modem authority.
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.44
40. Id. at 493.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 494.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 494-95. The social science data the Brown Court relied upon for its statement about "modern
authority" is set forth in note 11 of the opinion. The data relied upon by Brown and cited in note 11 of the opin-
ion has since been strongly criticized. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2064 n.2 (1995)(Thomas, J.,
concurring). The Brown opinion may well have been stronger if the Court had merely followed the lead of
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy where Justice Harlan found the fundamental problem with "separate but
equal" facilities was that the doctrine impermissibly interferes with "personal liberty" and is a "badge of servi-
tude" in and of itself. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 263-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). At least one current Supreme Court
Justice has stated that "Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-science research in
order to announce the simple, yet fundamental truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens
on the basis of race." Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2064 (1995)(Thomas, J., concurring).
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The Court concluded its opinion with the following very strong statement:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.45
III. THE REACTION TO Brown
Brown, in holding that separate but equal was inherently unequal in the educa-
tional context, was a watershed decision that changed the definition of "right"
and "wrong" from a constitutional perspective. However, stating what is "right"
and what is "wrong" is one thing; implementing the right when the wrong has
been in place for a long period of time is entirely another matter. Unlike the
Plessy decision which condoned and upheld the status quo, Brown held that the
underlying philosophy upon which the status quo had been built with law, physi-
cal facilities, and personnel had to be dismantled. The Brown Court's courage in
redefining "right" and "wrong" was the first major step, but an even more diffi-
cult task lay ahead in implementing the change. To understand how difficult the
change would be, it is necessary to have some insight into the public and official
reaction to the decision, especially in the South. The attitudes and actions of
white Mississippians during the years following Brown provide an illustrative
example of the immensity of the task and the ferocity of the battle that the courts
would be undertaking in implementing the holding of Brown.
Simply put, the reaction to Brown in the South was one of outrage and defi-
ance, 46 and Mississippi is perhaps the best example. Mississippi in the 1950s
had two separate societies, one black and one white. Such was not unusual in
America at the time, but it is unarguable that Mississippi was one of the states
most dedicated and devoted to segregation. Intermarriage between the races was
prohibited. Public facilities, such as waiting rooms, were segregated. By law
and practice, blacks had long been relegated to an inferior position in both the
economy and society of the state. In 1950, for example, only five percent of
black Mississippians were registered to vote, the lowest rate in the United States,
despite the fact that forty-five percent of the population of the state was black, a
higher percentage than in any other state.47
The term "Jim Crow" labeled the legal apparatus in place in the South at the
time to separate blacks and whites. One writer has summarized what the term
meant and the extremes to which it was taken:
Jim Crow described a far reaching, institutional segregation that affected every
aspect of American life. Schools, restaurants, trains and all forms of transporta-
45. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
46. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 38-39; See also ERLE JOHNSTON, MIssIssippI's DEFIANT YEARS
1953-1973 (1990).
47. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 208.
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tion, theaters, drinking fountains-virtually all public and many private facili-
ties practiced total separation of the races. The state of Florida went so far as to
require "Negro" and "white" textbooks, and in South Carolina black and white
cotton-mill workers were prohibited from looking out the same window.4"
Southern whites in Mississippi considered Brown as an attack on the values
they held most dear. In response to the decision, an organization named the
Citizens' Council was organized in Mississippi with a goal of creating a grass
roots organization that could influence public opinion and inspire the Supreme
Court to reverse its decision. 9 The Citizens' Council organization flourished
with membership including state legislators, state officials, and professional and
business people."0 In 1956, published reports claimed there were 50,000 mem-
bers of the Citizens' Council in Mississippi alone, with the organization spread-
ing to other southern states." Deemed the "white collar klan" by civil rights
activists at the time, the Citizens' Council, comprised of urban, middle class
whites, implemented an aggressive speaking program to preach against integra-
tion and sought to control blacks through economic reprisal.5 2 The purpose was
"'to make it difficult, if not impossible, for any Negro who advocates desegrega-
tion to find and hold a job, get credit, or renew a mortgage."'5 3 Moderation was
not considered; the stakes were all or nothing. This philosophy is summarized in
the speech used by Citizens' Council speakers at the time. The speech is worth
quoting at length because it conveys well both the logic and emotion of the oppo-
sition to Brown.
"We have seen how a Negro organization called the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People has prevailed on the United States Supreme
Court to declare that segregated schools violate the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Yet there has been no change in the Constitution, and Congress
has enacted no new law requiring integration. They talk about the 14th
Amendment but they refuse to admit the Congress that adopted the 14th
Amendment and submitted it to the states was the same Congress that set up the
segregated school system in Washington, D.C.! We are not going to let nine old
men originate their own law and try to cram it down the throats of true, red-
blooded Southerners!
We are in one of our greatest crises since Reconstruction. Our forefathers
handled that situation effectively; now it is up to us to do the same. We believe
in our Constitution. But the Tenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights asserts
specifically that powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to
the states respectively.
48. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 12-13.
49. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 12.
50. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 14.
51. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 15.
52. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 39.
53. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 39.
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This means that control of the schools and suffrage are left to the people of
the sovereign states. We will not abide by this legislative decision by a political
court. School integration is the first step toward racial intermarriage. Wherever
white men infused their blood with the Negroes, white intellect and white cul-
ture perished. It happened tragically in Egypt, Babylon, Greece, Rome, India,
Spain and Portugal. When the NAACP petitioned the Court for integration, it
was to open the bedroom doors of white women to Negro men.
Now I want to see if all of you are willing to stand up and be counted. I want
to know if you will join me, to make this organization one of the most powerful
in the United States, approving total segregation only, and frowning on the mod-
erates and pussy footers who think that the Supreme Court edict is an inevitable
way of life that we must crawl on our knees and accept!"'"
Beyond economic reprisal and rhetoric, white Mississippians also undertook
legal and political action to oppose the decision. For instance, Walter J.
Simmons, a leader and spokesman in the Citizens' Council, proposed to then
Mississippi Governor Hugh White in a letter dated May 23, 1954, that the Brown
decision be opposed at every level, through the courts, and through the
Legislature so "'that the present public school system be continued without alter-
ation but if any attempt is made to enforce racial integration in any school by
federal police power, that school should be closed for the duration of the enforce-
ment effort."' 5 Though public schools were never actually closed, the voters of
the state did approve a resolution in December 1954, by a two to one majority,
giving the state legislature authority to abolish Mississippi's public schools if it
appeared integration was actually going to occur.5" Mississippi would aggres-
sively fight desegregation through the courts right up until the end of the battle
when the Supreme Court finally ordered massive desegregation in Mississippi to
begin with the 1970-71 school year.
7
Mississippi media leaders, politicians, and religious leaders flamed the passion
of the people on the race issue. The editor of the Jackson Daily News wrote that
"No matter what delayed plan the Supreme Court may propose for enforcement
of its decision, that plan is not going to be acceptable in Mississippi." 8 The edi-
tor then called for a popular referendum in each state to declare the "Supreme
Court racial amalgamation edict to be null and void within the boundaries of
these states."5 9 United States Senator James Eastland of Mississippi said on May
27, 1954 on the floor of the Senate:
"What the Supreme Court has done is legislate civil rights which admittedly
were not authorized by the Constitution or by Congress. The Court has over-
turned a great principle of law and has made illegal the acts of states, which the
great judges who heretofore have composed the Court had held for generations
54. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 14.
55. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 10.
56. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 23-24.
57. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 366-69.
58. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 10.
59. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 11.
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did not violate the 14th Amendment. The amendment could not have one mean-
ing in 1896, when the court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, and a different meaning
to the present Court."
"Let me make this very clear. The South will retain segregation!
60
For the next several years, successful politicians used the pro-segregation, anti-
integration theme as a means to election. 1 Those politicians that counseled mod-
eration were defeated.6 2 A leading Mississippi clergyman, Reverend G. T.
Gillespie, President Emeritus of Belhaven College in Jackson, wrote that there
was "considerable data" in the Bible in support of the "general principle of segre-
gation as an important feature of the Divine purpose and Providence throughout
the ages."63 By equating segregation with God's plan, any act opposing desegre-
gation was both justified and necessary; no middle ground was acceptable. 4
In 1956, the Citizens' Council efforts were supplemented by the formation of a
state-funded agency used to gather information on civil rights workers and gen-
erally to support the state of Mississippi's stand against desegregation. The
agency, called the Sovereignty Commission, was not dissolved until 1973.6 The
purpose of the Commission in part was to conduct surveillance on civil rights
leaders. 7
The opposition to racial integration of schools and empowering blacks in
Mississippi went far beyond rhetorical economic, legal, or legislative action.
Violence was used often and brutally. When James Meredith entered the
University of Mississippi in 1962, 2 men died, 160 federal marshals were injured,
and 28 marshals were shot, in what has been called the last battle of the Civil
War.6 8 The infamous Emmett Till case showed that it was de facto not a crime in
Mississippi state courts in 1955, in the wake of Brown, for a white man to kill a
black boy for merely looking at a white woman.69 Three young men were killed
for trying to register people to vote in 1964, and the men arrested were never
tried in state court.7" In 1967, Medgar Evers, the State NAACP Director, was
gunned down in cold blood in his driveway in Jackson, Mississippi.71 Though
many of these violent acts (and numerous others) centered on issues other than
school integration (e.g., access to public facilities, voting rights, etc.), they all
60. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 16-17.
61. See generally, JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 28-33, 222-25.
62. One elected official who did take a middle ground by disapproving the Brown decision but nevertheless
urging calm and urging the people to obey it was Congressman Frank Smith, elected to- represent the Third
Congressional District of Mississippi in 1950. When congressional districts were combined in 1962,
Congressman Jamie Whitten defeated Congressman Smith in what was viewed a conservative versus liberal
battle with views on segregation as being the decisive issue. See JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 410.
63. See generally, JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 25-26.
64. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 25-26.
65. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 48-52.
66. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 379.
67. JOHNSTON, supra note 46, at 383.
68. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 217.
69. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 39-57.
70. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 234-35.
71. WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 221-25.
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derived from the same nucleus of resistance to federal efforts to insure the civil
rights of blacks.
The foregoing is not by any means an exhaustive recount of the history of that
time period in Mississippi following Brown until approximately 1970, but it does
demonstrate that adamant, almost hysterical, resistance to the Brown decision
was the norm in Mississippi. The same was also true in other parts of the
South.72 It is only with this knowledge in mind that one can accurately under-
stand the leading Supreme Court decisions implementing the Brown decision in
the 1960s and early 1970s.
IV. IMPLEMENTING Brown
The Court, in the next term after Brown was decided, took the first step toward
the implementation of Brown in a second decision commonly referred to as
Brown H." In Brown II, the Supreme Court set forth the guidelines district
courts were to use in implementing Brown."' The Court held, in remanding the
Brown I cases to the lower courts, that the lower courts should be guided by equi-
table principles that took into account the personal interest of the plaintiffs and
the public interest.7" All defendants had to make a prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance, but the lower courts could authorize additional time if
necessary to carry out an effective ruling.7" Factors that the Court could consider
in making this determination included administrative problems, facility prob-
iems, transportation problems, personnel problems, the need to revise school dis-
tricts in attendance areas, and the need to revise local laws and regulations.77
Lower courts were to "take the necessary and proper actions, based upon their
equitable power, to insure that black children were allowed to go to school with-
out regard to their race."'78 The timing of these actions was to be with "all delib-
erate speed, 79 a vague standard that gave virtually unlimited discretion to lower
courts to act or not to act.
Unfortunately, but not necessarily surprising considering the opposition that
Brown sparked in the South, "all deliberate speed" meant no speed as to actual
elimination of segregation in many areas. An often used remedy in Mississippi,
so-called "freedom of choice" plans, where students in a district could choose
where they wanted to attend, often resulted in essentially no decrease in segrega-
tion in terms of black/white ratios.8" The Supreme Court's tolerance of the delay
ended in 1968 with the case of Green v. County School Board.81 Green modified
72. For example, federal troops were necessary to desegregate the Little Rock, Arkansas schools. WILLIALMS,
supra note 23, at 92-119.
73. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
74. Id. at 298.
75. Id. at 300.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 300-301.
78. Id. at 301.
79. Id.
80. See infra, text at note 122; see supra note 1.
81. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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both Brown and Brown II by enlarging their holdings to shift the emphasis from
merely eliminating state sponsored segregation to eliminating all vestiges of seg-
regation "root and branch"82 and mandating that it be done "now."83
The question before the Court in Green was whether a "freedom of choice"
plan was a constitutionally sufficient remedy to satisfy Brown and Brown II's
mandate to achieve a "racially, nondiscriminatory school system" in all respects,
including administration, transportation, local laws, personnel, and admission of
students.84 The school district in question was New Kent County located in rural
eastern Virginia.8" Approximately half of the county's population of 4,500 were
black, with persons of both races residing throughout the county.86 The school
system had two schools, one on the east side and one on the west side of the
county, with both schools serving the entire county. 7 Overlapping bus routes for
the two separate schools still went over the entire county.88 The school on the
east side was white, and the school on the west side was black.89 The segregated
system had originally been set up under Virginia constitutional and statutory pro-
visions that the Supreme Court had struck down as unconstitutional in Brown."
Following the Brown decision, the school district had continued to operate seg-
regated schools, though the state had acted to allow students to seek enrollment
through the direction of the State Board of Education at other schools.91 By
September 1964, not a single black pupil had applied for admission to the white
school and not a single white student had applied for admission to the black
school.92 In 1965, the school board, in order to remain eligible for federal finan-
cial aid, adopted a "freedom of choice plan" for desegregation under which
pupils in the first through eighth grades could choose each year whether they
wanted to go the white school or the black school, with pupils not making a
choice being assigned to the school they previously attended.93 In the first three
years of operation of the "freedom of choice plan," not a single white child had
chosen to go to the black school, and eighty-five percent of the black children
still attended the black school. 4
The Court, in addressing these facts, acted strongly in an opinion, the tone of
which clearly indicates the impatience of the Court. The Court interpreted
Brown II as "a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems"95 and
replacement of them with "unitary, non racial system[s]."9 Though Brown's
82. Id. at 437-38.
83. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 437.
85. Id. at 432.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 434.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 432. One of the four cases before the Brown court was a Virginia case. See discussion at note 32.
91. Id. at 433.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 433-34.
94. Id. at 441.
95. Id. at 437.
96. Id. at 436.
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principal focus was giving black children a place in white schools,97 this was
only the first step. The goal, as interpreted by Green, was a "system without a
'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."98 Despite the flexibility
contemplated by Brown II to allow district courts to deal with the problem that
transition from a dual system to a unitary system might entail, these problems
could not stand in the way of action.99 Instead, regardless of what problems
might be encountered, Green was a mandate to "take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.""1 ' Delays were "no longer tolerable." ' The "nec-
essary and proper" action, left undefined in Brown II, was defined in Green in
emphatic terms: "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now."1 2 The time for "deliberate speed"
was over.
103
Though not categorically ruling out freedom of choice as an effective remedy
against desegregation, the Court struck down the freedom of choice plan before
it in Green as unacceptable.104 The Court specifically noted that the plan had
been in effect for three years of operation, but not a single white child had cho-
sen to attend the black school and only fifteen percent of the black students had
chosen to attend the white school.0 5 The decision made it clear that the permis-
sibility of a freedom of choice plan would be governed by how well it worked in
creating a "unitary" system. Unitary clearly meant schools that were racially
mixed (i.e., a "system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just
schools"). 6 The Court specifically rejected the idea of "freedom of choice as
being the objective, even if there was true 'freedom.""'1 7 The objective was an
integrated system,108 and the burden of responsibility to meet the goal was that of
the school officials, not the parents. 9 The means to be used was to be the
speediest of the available alternatives. "'
Green is the classic case of the Court doing what is necessary under the cir-
cumstances to be effective, or in the words of Holmes quoted at the beginning of
this Article, reacting to the "necessities of the time." ' The Court noted specifi-
97. Id. at 435-36.
98. Id. at 442.
99. Id. at 436-38.
100. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 438.
102. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 438. The Court had actually said that the time for "deliberate speed" was over as early as 1964 in
the case of Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Green, however, is the case that is generally recog-
nized as the turning point in the Court's remedy for Brown. With regard to Mississippi, it is the case that finally
promoted aggressive action to implement integration. See, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F2d
852 (5th Cir. 1969) discussed infra.
104. Green, 391 U.S. at 441.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 442.
107. Id. at 440.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 441-42.
110. Id. at 441. (In Green, the Court suggested zoning as the way to go).
111. See HOLMES, supra note 5.
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cally that the "freedom of choice plan" was not adopted until eleven years after
Brown and ten years after Brown H.112 The Court characterized this delay as a
"deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitutional dual system." 113 The Court
obviously did not feel there had been any true "good faith compliance" 1 4 con-
templated by the highly discretionary Brown II standard of all "necessary and
proper actions" in "all deliberate speed." Instead, the Green Court decided that,
from a practical standpoint, the standard necessary to counter the resistance and
deliberate delay was to integrate "now" using the quickest means available. In
decisions that followed Green, it became clear that the Court's power to fashion
remedies was indeed broad and that the court would use extraordinary means in
response to extraordinary resistance. By way of example, in subsequent deci-
sions the Court approved busing to achieve racial quotas,1 ' approved the deseg-
regation of faculties according to specific mathematical ratios,116 and approved
the use of remedial or compensatory education programs paid for by the state.117
Considering the facts of Green and the general resistance to Brown in the
South, the adamant tone and the holding of the Green decision is not surprising.
Under different circumstances, one would have to question a decision that took
away individual choice as a remedy for the state not allowing blacks to choose to
go to school with whites in the first place. There is a fine, yet distinct, difference
between the state forcing children to be separate and the state forcing children to
be together. In the context of the resistance to the Brown decision that the Court
faced at the time, however, this distinction was probably not significant. Thus, it
is only when Green is viewed in the context of the times that it can be properly
understood. Given the times, it was not unreasonable to assume that the freedom
of choice plan considered in Green allowed true freedom in name only.
V Green APPLIED TO MISSISSIPPI
After the Green case was decided, the change in the constitutional remedy for
dual school systems set forth in Green was quickly applied by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to Mississippi and affirmed by the Supreme Court
in such a manner that desegregation plans were implemented on a statewide basis
starting in 1970.
The Mississippi case which gave the Supreme Court-an opportunity to address
the Mississippi situation was that of United States v. Hinds County School
Board."8 The case involved twenty-five school desegregation cases that had
been consolidated on appeal from an en bane decision of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.1 9 The issue in the case,
112. Green, 391 U.S. at 438.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 436 (quoting Brown 11 v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. at 299 (1955)).
115. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
116. United States v. Montgomery County. Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
117. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
118. 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
119. Id. at 854.
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as in the Green case, was whether freedom of choice plans met the constitutional
standard for an adequate remedy to dual school systems segregated on the basis
of race which had been outlawed in Brown. As the Fifth Circuit presented the
question: "These cases present a common issue: whether the District Court
erred in approving the continued use by these school districts of freedom of
choice plans as a method for the disestablishment of the dual school systems.' 20
The test as to whether the freedom of choice plans were constitutionally adequate
was a test based strictly upon the racial make-up of the schools. As stated by the
court: "If in a school district there are still all-Negro schools or only a small
fraction of Negroes enrolled in white schools, or no substantial integration of
faculties and school activities, then, as a matter of law, the existing plan fails to
meet constitutional standards as established in Green.''
The court then proceeded to strike down the freedom of choice plans being
used in the Mississippi school districts as constitutionally inadequate on the basis
that no white students had chosen to attend traditionally negro schools and the
percentages of negro students choosing to attend white schools ranged from a
low of zero percent to a high of sixteen percent, an inadequate amount in the
court's judgment, since such was "a degree of desegregation held to be inade-
quate in Green v. County School Board."122 The court ordered that the defendant
school boards, in collaboration with the Federal Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, come up with a plan to dismantle the dual school sys-
tems with regard to faculty assignment, school bus routes, all facilities, all athlet-
ic and other school activities, and all school location and construction activities,
and that the plan be implemented with the beginning of the 1969-70 school
year. 123
The Hinds County School Board case was immediately appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion with
regard to the case in a decision styled Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education. 124 In Alexander, the Court, citing Green, upheld the Fifth Circuit
decision and refused to allow extra time for the transition. The Court stated that
the explicit prior holdings of the Supreme Court required "every school district
. .. to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter
only unitary schools."12 Green's mandate to eliminate school segregation "root
and branch" through integration "now" had been applied in full force to
Mississippi. Mississippi schools integrated in 1970, less than a year after the
Alexander decision was decided.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 855(quoting Adams v. Matthews, 403 F.2d 181, 188 (5th Cir. 1968)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 858.
124. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
125. Id. at 20.
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VI. A PERSONAL OBSERVATION
Whether integration was successful in Mississippi depends upon one's view.
Some feel the change destroyed public education by causing whites to leave,
while others feel it made public education real and available for all
Mississippians, both white and black.
My view is more personal. Based upon my experience as a member of the
freshman class at Eupora High School when desegregation occurred, I believe it
was a success. At the time that my class entered high school, I can personally
remember there were many naysayers that said we would not succeed. All of us,
black and white, almost certainly felt the same emotions from time to time.
After all, we were children of the South. When we started classes in the fall of
1970, we were essentially two separate classes, one black and one white, even
though we were attending school in the same building. At the end of the four
years of high school, however, when we were all sitting together on the football
field during graduation, I was very proud to know that the naysayers, at least
with regard to our class, had been wrong. We had succeeded.
Though there had been bumpy places along the road, our class of blacks and
whites had largely bonded together into a group with one common identity as the
Eupora High School Class of 1974. We were the first class to hold an integrated
ten year class reunion. Though I am aware that other school systems did not
have as easy a transition and that racial problems still trouble many school dis-
tricts, I am confident in saying, based upon my own experience, that those who
predicted that desegregation per se would not be a success were just flatly wrong.
I personally am glad the Supreme Court decided Green as it did, for I feel that I
am a better and more complete Mississippian by going to school with black
Mississippians. If Green had been decided differently, such would not have
occurred.
VII. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Forty-two years have come and gone since the Brown decision in 1954. A
great deal can change in forty-two years. Such is certainly true in Mississippi.
Though race is still a major factor in the daily lives of Mississippians, one would
strain credibility to argue that the racial atmosphere in the state is anywhere near
the defiant atmosphere of the 1950s and 1960s. To the extent that any given
Mississippi public school remains predominantly black or predominantly white,
it almost certainly is a result of other factors such as demographic change, popu-
lation shifts, and other private choices, some admirable and some not, as opposed
to official state policy.
Mississippi is apparently not isolated in this aspect, for the recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with school desegregation clearly indicate that the Court
is moving in a direction that recognizes the limits of judicial capacity and author-
ity to run local school systems indefinitely through the equitable power of feder-
al courts in those school districts where the federal courts have intervened. A
good example of how the Court's approach to the issue has changed with the
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times is the 1992 case of Freeman v. Pitts'2 6 in which the Court refused to focus
solely on student black/white ratios as the measure of constitutional correctness
and emphasized the imperative to return school systems to local political authori-
ties as soon as practical.12'
In Freeman, the Court held that a lower federal court in an ongoing desegrega-
tion case has the discretion to withdraw its supervision over those areas of a
school district in which there has been a court ordered desegregation plan, even
if other aspects of the system remain in non-compliance.'28 The criteria that a
district court is to use is three-part. First, the district court should consider
whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the desegregation
decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn.129
Second, the court should consider whether judicial control is necessary or practi-
cal to achieve compliance withthe decree in other facets of the school system.
130
Third, the district court must consider whether the affected school district has
demonstrated to the public and the parents of the students of the disfavored race
the district's good faith commitment to hold to the court's decree and to federal
law serving as the predicate for judicial intervention. 3 Based upon these crite-
ria, the Freeman Court upheld the district court's determination that the school
district in question was "a unitary system with regard to student assignments,
transportation, physical facilities and extracurricular activities," and that as such,
no further relief would be ordered in these areas even though the district court
retained jurisdiction in the areas of teacher and principal assignments, resource
allocations, and quality of education where compliance had not been achieved.
32
The plaintiffs in the Freeman case were black school children and their parents
who brought suit within two months of the Supreme Court's 1968 Green deci-
sion.1 33 The district court, for the 1969-70 school year, entered a consent order
abolishing the freedom of choice plan that had been in effect and adopting the
neighborhood school attendance plan that closed all the former black schools and
reassigned their students among the remaining neighborhood schools.1 34 Between
implementation of the new plan and the school district's motion for a dismissal
of the litigation on the basis that the school district had satisfied its duty to elimi-
nate a dual education system, only minor changes were made in the plan. The
amount of judicial involvement was limited and infrequent.'
35
From 1969 when the suit was initially filed until the time a motion to dismiss
the case was filed in 1986, the racial make-up of the school district had changed
dramatically. In 1969 when the black plaintiffs initially filed their suit, the white
126. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 485.
129. Id. at 491.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 474.
133. Id. at 472-73.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 473-74.
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school system had only 5.6% black enrollment.136 By 1986, the percentage of
black students was forty-seven percent.137 In 1970, there were 7,615 non-whites
living in the northern part of the county where the school district was located,
while there were 11,508 non-whites in the southern part of the county. By 1980,
the numbers had changed dramatically, with 15,365 non-whites living in the
northern part of the county, and 87,583 non-whites living in the southern part of
the county. In short, the black population in the southern part of the county had
experienced tremendous growth while the white population did not, and the
white population in the northern part of the county experienced tremendous
growth while the black population did not.138
Although forty-seven percent of the students in the school system were black
in 1986, fifty percent of the black students attended schools that were over ninety
percent black, sixty-two percent of all black students attended schools that had
more than twenty percent more blacks than the system-wide average, twenty-
seven percent of white students attended schools that were more than ninety per-
cent white, fifty-nine percent of white students attended schools that had more
than twenty percent more whites than the system-wide average.139 Five of the,
twenty-two high schools were more than ninety percent black, while another five
were more than eighty percent black. Of the seventy-four elementary schools,
eighteen were over ninety percent black, and ten were over ninety percent
white. 4
Though the statistics recited above do show significantly more racial balance
overall in the school system when compared to the racial balance in the system in
1969-70, the statistics clearly demonstrate, borrowing the definition of "unitary"
stated in Green, that there existed in 1986 many schools in the system that nomi-
nally would be identified as "black" schools or "white" schools, as opposed to
just "schools." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding
of"unitariness" in student assignments in the face of these statistics.1 41 Contrary
to the rigid and narrowly focused approach of Green to the concept of unitari-
ness, the Freeman case did not focus solely on racial percentages in its evaluation
of the term "unitary" but instead took a broader approach that allows district
courts to look more at the total picture. Rather than a fixed meaning based upon
racial percentages, a unitary school system, according to Freeman, is a school
system in "'compliance with the command of the Constitution,"'142 and further
than that, the term "does not have fixed meaning or content. ' 143 Though racial
imbalances may exist, they must be causally linked to a constitutional violation
by the state before they are constitutionally impermissible.144 The court agreed
with the lower court that the racial make-up of the school population was the
136. Id. at 475.
137. Id. at 475-76.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 477-78.
140. Id. at 478.
141. Id. at 474.
142. Id. at 487 (quoting Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991)).
143. Id. at 487.
144. Id. at 494-95.
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result of changing residential patterns that in turn were the result of private, not
state, choices. 145 As such, it was not within the Court's authority to address the
racial make-up of the student population further. 4 In essence, the Court held
that "unitary" is more a function of the reason racial imbalance exists than
whether it does or does not exist.
The change that has taken place between the approaches of Green and
Freeman is perhaps best explained by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in
Freeman. While acknowledging that the affirmative duty to desegregate set forth
in Green incorporated and used a presumption "extraordinary in law but not
unreasonable in fact"'47 to fashion an effective remedy to the longstanding and
formerly constitutional practice of state sponsored segregation, Justice Scalia
opined that the country (and the Court) was close to the time to go back to ordi-
nary principles whereby a plaintiff "must prove intent and causation and not
merely the existence of racial disparity" 148 to justify a court's intervention on
constitutional grounds. 49 In other words, the presumption of bad faith on the
part of local authorities is no longer factually justified, and the law must change
accordingly.
Just as significant, and very much related to the new concept of unitary used
by Freeman, is the Freeman Court's emphasis on the importance of returning the
school districts to the control of local authorities. 5 The Court emphasized that
judicial supervision of school systems was to be temporary in nature,15' and a
major factor to be considered in determining whether the system could be
returned to local authorities is evidence of "good faith commitment" on the part
of local authorities.1 52 In the more recent case of Missouri v. Jenkins, 53 where
the Supreme Court ordered the Freeman test be applied, the Court went even fur-
ther and stated that a co-equal goal (i.e., "end purpose") of court ordered remedi-
al action, in addition to remedying the violation, is to restore local control.
In summary, the Freeman opinion, both in tone and substance, strongly indi-
cates that the Supreme Court recognizes that federal constitutional law with
regard to school integration must take into account the changing circumstances
of the times. Though racial imbalance in schools in the 1950s and 1960s in the
South and other parts of the country undoubtedly was the result of state policy,
the same is not necessarily true in the 1990s, some twenty-five to thirty years
after the Green decision mandating that dual systems be eliminated "now." As
such, the Supreme Court is now approaching cases in a more flexible manner
145. Id.
146. Id. See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2051 (1995)(holding that pursuit of "desegregative
attractiveness" is beyond the scope of the court's remedial authority). Jenkins further held that "white flight" is
not something to be remedied by the courts, even if it results from court desegregation orders.
147. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id.
* 150. Id. at 489-90.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 499.
153. 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2055 (1995).
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that does not assume that the racial imbalance in schools in any given school dis-
trict is the result of state policy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Law students often debate the question of whether the law shapes society or
whether society shapes the law. The broad trends in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence discussed in this Article concerning school desegregation issues indicate
that both phenomena occur. In Brown, the Court established a new definition of
right and wrong that would completely transform American public school educa-
tion. In Brown II, the Court set forth a very flexible equitable remedy designed
to give courts and local school districts flexibility in implementing the new defi-
nition of "right" and "wrong." When the Brown II remedy did not work due to
resistance to Brown's new definition of "right" and "wrong," the Court changed
the remedy in its Green decision, a change that directly affected almost all
Mississippians. However one views the Green decision, its mandate that the
proper remedy for segregation was integration "now" made the standard of
Brown a reality, despite fierce, even vehement, opposition on the part of people
in the South. In the 1990s, however, forty-two years after Brown was decided,
things have changed, and Supreme Court integration law has likewise changed to
accommodate the new reality. No longer is segregation presumed to be a result
of state action. Instead, traditional notions of equity and the requirement of state
action are again being used as the appropriate standard.
One of my law professors was fond of saying that when the reason for the rule
no longer exists, the rule should no longer be followed. The Supreme Court has
indicated that something like that has happened now in the 1990s with regard to
the Green remedy designed in 1968 to eliminate state mandated school segrega-
tion. The important question now is whether the change the Court seems to be
accommodating is real; in other words, has the Court made a wise judgment by
backing off its Green standard and returning to a more flexible approach? To
answer this question is beyond the scope of this Article, but the answer will
undoubtedly require not only insight into our society, but also into the evolution
of the law. As Holmes said, in concluding the passage set forth at the beginning
of this Article regarding the nature of the law:
We must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the
most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into new
products at every stage.
15 4
154. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 1.
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